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The sentiment that the Constitution needs to be radically altered to keep up with
the times is by now a fairly old one. It originated in the early years of the twentieth
century where progressives insisted that the Constitution must be viewed in Darwinian
terms so that we could “adapt” it to the “opinion of the age.”1 This notion of adaptation or
evolution rejected the idea of a fixed constitution. Whether it was our inherited
understanding of liberty, or constitutional forms such as the separation of powers, we
would have to adapt these to meet the needs of “political development.”2 While
progressive arguments combined pragmatic and evolutionary justifications, both strands
of thought tended to reject the notion of permanent constitutional foundations. Thus
progressives were often dismissive of fixed constitutional rights and limits as a relic of
eighteenth-century thought that must be reconstructed to bring our government into
accord with the flow of History.3 In Woodrow Wilson’s words, a “living” constitution
“must be Darwinian in structure and practice [as] no living thing can have its organs
offset against each other as checks, and live. On the contrary, its life is dependent upon
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their quick cooperation, their ready response to the commands of instinct or intelligence,
their amicable community of purpose.” 4
Subsequent calls for constitutional reform have often born a heavy debt to the
progressives—and Wilson in particular. Consider the APSA report on “responsible party
government,” James McGregor Burns’ call for a parliamentary government, Robert
Dahl’s insistence on “polyarchy,” and the Committee on the Constitution’s desire to
bring cabinet government into the fold of our constitutional system. All follow in
Wilson’s footsteps, seeking to alter or overcome elements of America’s written
Constitution—particularly its embrace of the separation of powers and checks and
balances—to bring it in line with modern governance.5 Professor Levinson’s Our
Undemocratic Constitution is partly in this vein—but only partly.6 I take him seriously
when he insists on being a kindred spirit with the Founders who themselves insisted on
“learning from experience,” creating a Constitution to suit their needs.7 This insistence
runs throughout The Federalist. Moreover, in defending the Constitution, The Federalist
speaks of “aptitude and tendency,” or in the language of modern political science,
probability, not certainty, as it recognizes the Constitution is an imperfect experiment.
This recognition led James Madison, in fact, to be much less sanguine about maintaining
constitutional government than Wilson, whose Constitutional Government reads as an
4

Wilson, Constitutional Government, 57, 56.

5

APSA report, “Responsible Two Party Government”; Burns, Democracy’s Deadlock, Dahl, A Preface to
Democratic Theory and How Democratic is the American Constitution?; and Lloyd Cutler,___ . Much
recent scholarship, however, has criticized the Wilsonian view of the separation of powers. See Jessica
Korn, The Myth of the Legislative Veto (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996), Joseph Bessette, The
Mild Voice of Reason (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004), and Daniel Stid, The President as
Statesman (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1996).
6

Sanford Levinson, Our Undemocratic Constitution: Where the Constitution Goes Wrong (And How We
the People Can Correct It) (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006).

7

Ibid., 15.

2

extended quarrel with Madison.8 While Wilson would insist that government “is not a
body of blind forces; it is a body of men,” this was, pace Wilson, precisely what
underpinned Madison’s constitutionalism.9 It was based, that is, on the lessons of history
and experience, not the ingenious musings of a theorist planning a constitution from the
closet of his imagination.
The history and experience of American constitutionalism makes it difficult to
think of our Constitution as an eighteenth century constitution. Yet, if I found myself at
Levinson’s constitutional convention, I would caution against a progressive view of
History or “constitutional development.” Indeed, against such views, I would insist on
elements of eighteenth century constitutionalism that our Constitution embraces and, so I
would argue, should be foundational to any new form of government we created in the
twenty first century. I briefly take up these issues in turn.
An Eighteenth Century Constitution?
Because the Constitution does not speak for itself, if not properly contrived, as
argued in The Federalist, No. 48, the Constitution might become a “mere demarcation on
parchment.”10 Yet to vest authority to “speak” for the fundamental law in any one body is
effectively to make that body sovereign. Thus the purposeful division of power within the
Constitution is based on a refusal to vest sovereign authority in any single body—
including in “the people themselves,” even if the Constitution implicitly recognizes their
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revolutionary right to “alter or abolish” this particular constitution.11 The very diffusion
of sovereign authority—what Aristotle called the distribution of offices—speaks to the
fundamental nature of the polity: it is neither “democratic” nor “undemocratic.”12 Rather,
the Constitution is a “complex and skillfully contrived” blend of liberalism and
democracy that is characterized by tension.13 This is evident insofar as natural rights and
popular sovereignty both provide the foundation of our Constitution. In this way,
American constitutionalism is ordered around agonistic institutions and principles.
The ineluctable result of this move, so much at the heart of eighteenth century
constitutionalism, is to make the Constitution “resistant as a whole to any sustained
settlement of the kind that either a demagogue or a sovereign authoritative point of view
might try to impose.”14 But this has also meant that the Constitution rarely finds coherent
expression as a whole. Rather, attempts to construct and reconstruct constitutional
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authority and meaning have been the norm.15 We might characterize these attempts as an
interaction between America’s small “c” constitution, which has aptly been described as
America’s constitutional soul, and our large “C” formal constitution.16 To be sure,
debates about constitutional ideas are historically rooted in struggles to justify particular
policies and political projects. But they also illuminate what it has meant to bring the
Constitution to life. These ideas, moreover, have shaped how we think and speak about
the Constitution, even while the Constitution shapes the horizon in which such political
struggles take place.
As a polity, if we have a sort of constitutional faith, we have disagreed profoundly
about constitutional meaning and authority, engaging in conflicted struggles over the
proper ordering of constitutional values. Many of these constitutional reconstructions
depart significantly from our eighteenth century constitution, as in the near erasure of the
ninth amendment,17 or in how we elect presidents. Others, such as political parties, may
go against original visions but are consistent with original ends. Yet attempts to construct
or reconstruct constitutional meaning and authority are frequently arguments over
precisely what constitutional ends require. Even those statesmen who have been thought
to radically alter the Founders’ Constitution often insisted that they were simply adapting
constitutional meaning and authority to the Founders ends. In this spirit, FDR frequently
cast himself as adhering to the substantive ends of the Constitution, even while viewing
constitutional forms as instrumental and, therefore, adaptable in the pursuit of
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foundational ends.18 Erstwhile New Dealers like Robert Jackson and Felix Frankfurter
often insisted that the New Deal flowed from the Founder’s constitutional commitments
in this manner, which would make the New Deal a constitutional “restoration” rather than
a constitutional “revolution.”19 Such an understanding might even plausibly be manifest
in Justice Cardozo’s attempt to capture the spirit of the Founders: “It is not in my
judgment inconsistent with what they [the Founders] would say today nor with what they
would believe, if they were called upon to interpret ‘in light of our whole experience’ the
constitution that they framed for the needs of an expanding future.” This is quite different
from a “living” constitution that rejects foundations in favor of historical evolution.
Yet FDR also drew deeply on historical adaptation—perhaps even rejecting
foundational ends. This sentiment is characterized by Frankfurter’s insistence, nurturing
three decades of progressive thought, the “Constitution of the United States is most
significantly not a document but a stream of history.”20 Or Cardozo’s insistence “that the
juristic philosophy of the common law is at bottom the philosophy of pragmatism. Its
truth is relative, not absolute.”21 This was surely true of the progressive insistence on
“pure democracy,” which would require a profound reconstruction of constitutional
liberty as well as an alteration, if not abandonment, of our formal constitutional
structures, in favor not just of history, but History. As Wilson put it in Constitutional
Government in the United States, “Governments are living things and operate as organic
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wholes. Moreover, governments have their natural evolution and are one thing in one age,
another in another.”22 In the New Freedom Wilson would explain this as a necessarily
progressive venture: “Progress, development—those are modern words. The modern idea
is to leave the past and press onward to something new.”23 For Wilson our understanding
of liberty and constitutional structure meant to protect it must evolve—or develop—with
large-scale historical change.
There is perhaps an understandable temptation to dispense with constitutional
forms in favor of grander and nobler constitutional ends—particularly given changing
historical circumstances. We might read the preamble to the Constitution for inspiration,
as it calls us to “establish justice” and “secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and
our Posterity.” We would be hard pressed to find such inspiration in the mundane
technicality of Article I. Or, even for those swept away by the Court as great defender of
individual liberty, Article III, Section 2: “The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in
Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and
Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Authority.” Demands for justice and
efficiency, articulated to some degree in the Constitution’s preamble, are often behind the
insistence on dramatic constitutional change, bringing the Constitution up to date by
making it more “democratic” or more effective. But we should notice that James Madison
viewed complex constitutional forms as a means of achieving justice. Recall that in his
most famous discussion of the separation of powers in Federalist 51, Madison concludes
his exposition on the virtues of the separation of powers by attaching it to the sentiment
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that “Justice is the end of government.”24 This is brought more vividly to light in a
subsequent sentence, “It [justice] ever has been and ever will be pursued until it be
obtained, or until liberty be lost in the pursuit.”25 The point is that justice might be best
achieved by preventing quick or authoritative action under the Constitution, particularly
authoritative or quick action that is done in the name of justice. The separation of powers
can be both means and ends: a means in preventing “usurpations,” an end in “promoting
sober deliberation”26 about the ends the Constitution aspires toward. Perhaps the
Constitution is no longer fostering and sustaining its substantive commitments. Perhaps
those commitments are relics of the eighteenth century. But we should be weary of
constitutional change as an imperative of History.27 As Ken Kersch describes it, this
Whiggish narrative of development involves “erasures” that gloss over the agonistic and
conflicted struggle between “liberties and liberties” and “rights and rights” that were
central to forging the institutions of the “New American State.” Thus rights and liberties,
long protected within the terms of traditional American constitutionalism, were, in accord
with the progressive imperative of state building as History, said to be no longer rights,
embracing Oscar Wilde’s quip that “the only duty we owe history is to rewrite it.”28
And yet I am open to the possibility that constitutional meaning is forged in the
historical interaction between general constitutional principles and particular political and
historical circumstances. This is not to say that whatever comes out of our historical
debates is constitutional meaning—that is the Constitution as history. Nor, though, is it to
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say that whatever meaning comes out of these great debates reveals to us the true nature
of our Constitution—that is the Constitution as History. Rather, it is to offer a more
tentative suggestion that confronted with particular historical circumstances, we are
forced to wrestle with constitutional identity at its most foundational level. In looking at
the question of constitutional continuity and change, Edmund Burke thought “before its
final settlement [a constitution] may be obliged to pass, as one of our poets says, ‘through
great varieties of untried being,’ and in all its transmigrations to be purified by fire and
blood.”29 Here I think there are lessons from the eighteenth century that remain relevant.
The Lessons of Eighteenth Century Constitutionalism
At the root of modern constitutionalism, embraced by our Constitution, is the
insistence on substantive limits to governmental power. While limits came to be
identified with individual rights, they were also rooted in an understanding of the limits
of politics. Thus even in a revolutionary act where the people alter or abolish a
constitution and create a new form of government they were limited in the reach of their
power. Recall that the Declaration itself, that great act of a revolutionary people, spoke
of our Constitution in these terms. If popular sovereignty is one facet of the American
amalgam, unlike Rousseau’s version, which “is nothing but the exercise of the general
will,” it has bounds. The revolution was justified not simply because American
sovereignty was being denied—“altering fundamentally the Forms of our
Governments”—but because “whenever any Form of Government” becomes destructive
of its ends, the people have a right to alter or abolish it. This revolutionary right is rooted
in the natural rights of human beings—and to “secure these Rights, Governments are
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instituted among Men.” There is, then, a limit to what consent, by way of popular
sovereignty, can legitimately achieve.30 This is evident in the thought of James Wilson,
Thomas Jefferson, and James Madison—three of the Founders most frequently turned to
in order to justify popular sovereignty as trumping, in various ways, constitutional
provisions.31 Interestingly, however, these thinkers often insisted that even outside of the
Constitution, in revolutionary rather than constitutional terms, the people are bound.
In his first lecture on jurisprudence, James Wilson insisted that the “revolutionary
principle” ought to be taught “as a principle for the constitution of the United States,”
and, during the ratifying conventions, he insisted that, “the truth is, that the supreme
absolute and uncontrollable authority, remains with the people.” Yet Wilson insisted on
this point as legitimizing the act of creating a new constitution based on the popular
authority of the people and not the states. Indeed, at the end of his speech he insisted that
the Declaration of Independence illustrated this unalienable right of the people.32 He then
proceeded to quote the second paragraph, where consent legitimizes power because it
obligates government to recognize unalienable rights—that is, unalienable individual
rights, which are the basis of the right of self-government.
In a similar manner, Jefferson insisted, again and again, that “the earth belongs
to the living” and, thus, that each generation has “a right to chose for itself the form of
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government it believes most promotive of its own happiness.”33 Jefferson, though, also
spoke of natural right as limiting what any generation acting as popular sovereign can do.
And even when Madison insisted the people are the best protectors of their rights, he
denied the “majority is the standard of right and wrong.” Madison also spoke of rights
prior to and binding upon civil society.34 I do not wish to labor over the intricacies of
these thinkers, so much as suggest that even in creating a constitutional order, they
tended to draw on a combination of popular sovereignty and natural rights, with the latter,
at the very least, tempering and limiting the reach of the former. Thus popular
sovereignty, even outside the Constitution, existed within a foundation and was distinct
from popular will.
The notion of substantive limits is in contrast to the insistence that rights can be
structured in purely pragmatic and procedural terms, or based on “authentic” acts of
popular constitutionalism. As Cass Sunstein argues, because rights are secured by
government—the result of legal rules—they can be reconstructed by the government to
meet the needs of history and democracy. 35 To say that rights are “constructed” would
hardly come as a surprise to the natural rights thinking of the Founders who insisted on
precisely this point. But they were constructed to comport with the fundamental nature of
human beings and government, then, was legitimately constituted to protect such rights.
Thus the legal realist insistence was novel, not in insisting that rights were constructs, but
in insisting that because they were constructs we could construct them to the needs of
33
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modern society. A similar sentiment finds expression in the popular constitutionalism of
Bruce Ackerman.36 Here popular sovereignty, when authentically expressed, cannot be
limited. In Rousseau’s words: “If, then, the people simply promises to obey, it dissolves
itself by that act and loses its character as a people; the moment there is a master, there is
no longer a sovereign, and forthwith the body politic is destroyed.”37 Yet how do we
know an “authentic” act of popular will when we see it? Such vexing questions are at the
root of formalizing politics in a written Constitution precisely so that foundational
questions do not turn on scrutinizing popular will.
Montesquieu’s eighteenth century constitutionalism may yet have something to
teach us. Professor Scheppele’s discussion of the sweeping claims of executive power,
rooted in international law and the “global war on terror,” are interesting in this light.
Perhaps the imperatives of the twenty-first century require a virtually unchecked
executive to protect and preserve our nation, which requires a radical reconstruction of
liberty. If we take the claims of History seriously, this may be what twenty-first century
constitutional development requires.38 It was, after all, Wilson who insisted on expansive
executive power as a means of overcoming constitutional checks in administering the will
of the people. In drawing out the popular potential of the presidency, Wilson insisted “Let
him once win the admiration and confidence of the county, and no other single force can
36
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withstand him . . . he is irresistible.”39 And it was progressives like Herbert Croly who
rejected the notion of separated power, insisting that, “a thoroughly representative
government is essentially government by men rather than by Law.”40
This sentiment, too, found expression in Rousseau: if sovereignty cannot be
bound, neither can it be divided, as he took aim at “separations” in politics altogether:
“But our politicians, being unable to divide sovereignty in its principle, divide it in its
object. They divide it into force and will, into legislative power and executive power; into
rights of taxation, or justice, and of war; into internal administration and foreign
relations—sometimes conflating all these branches into a fantastic being, formed of
disparate parts; it is as if they created a man from several different bodies, one with eyes,
another with arms, another with feet, and nothing else.”41 Yet maintaining some form of
the separations at heart of constitutional democracy may be more prudent then ever. As
Montesquieu insisted in sketching the notion of a separation of powers at the origins of
modern constitutionalism, the most important separation was not between the executive
and the legislature, but between both of these and the judiciary. And this was of a
judiciary that spoke to legal issues and not necessarily constitutional questions.
Furthermore, even in parliamentary systems there is the separation between the majority
and minority in parliament, as well as the separation between government and society,
public and private, and church and state for example. All of these separations are at the
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heart of constitutional democracy even if they may take different forms in different
polities. History has not rendered them irrelevant.42
Casting a glance at some of the most pressing political issues in the early years of
the twenty-first century might firm up our commitments to such constitutional
separations. The division between the legislature and executive may remain the most
effective means of utilizing and containing executive power. A merger of legislative and
executive powers may well increase the power of the executive. This could also be true of
a more “democratic” president insisting on popular will as the proper foundation of
power. Or take gay marriage. Returning to a more robust view of federalism, against the
centralizing tendencies of twentieth-century state building, may well be the best way to
deal with such fraught political issues in an increasingly pluralistic society. This
increasingly pluralistic society might also need a secular constitutional creed more than
ever as a means of providing us with some foundational unity. Against such notions of a
“national creed” we also find the latest manifestation of progressive History, as we are
encouraged to adapt our parochial Constitution to accord with the more cosmopolitan
imperatives of “global constitutionalism.” This fits, in part, with the universal aspirations
of eighteenth century constitutionalism as is evident in Professor Scheppele’s discussion
of modern rights conventions such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Yes,
the language of “natural rights” is absent, or obscured, but such universal rights are
difficult to think of in other terms.43 Here we might look at what is permanent about
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constitutionalism—and the “permeability of constitutional borders.”44 And yet it may be,
as theorists of eighteenth-century constitutionalism like Montesquieu and Madison
argued, that a constitution of our own remains the best method of protecting and fostering
such rights and values.
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